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Craig
Symonds has been professor of history at the United States
Naval Academy at Annapolis since 1976, where he was awarded
both the Academy's Excellence
in Teaching and Excellence in Research awards.
He is author of eight books on the Civil War, four historical
atlases, and several naval
histories.
Symonds opened
by saying that history is not the product of culture alone,
but may be driven by the decisions of strong individuals.
Using that premise, he went on to examine ten individuals
and the decisions they made that directly influenced the
outcome at Gettysburg. Through this unique perspective, Symonds
recounted the complex battle in a colorful fashion.
First on the list of ten has to be Robert E. Lee, commander of the Army
of Northern Virginia. It was Lee's decision to invade Pennsylvania that started
the machinations resulting in the epic 1863 battle.
From the Union side, Symonds' first pick was Joseph Hooker. Hooker's
resignation after his failure at Chancellorsville two months earlier allowed
Lincoln the opportunity to appoint George Gordon Meade to head the Army of
the Potomac.
The story of Confederate general J.E.B. Stuart is more complex. True,
he disappeared before the battle and did not provide Lee the military intelligence
he depended upon. On the other hand, Symonds credits Stuart with screening
Lee's movements north. He goes on to surmise that Stuart's bold ride around
Federal forces wasn't just grandstanding, but rather an attempt to redeem himself
for heavy southern losses at the cavalry engagement at Brandy Station the previous
month.
Though killed on the first day of battle, Union I Corps commander John Reynolds played
a key role. Reynolds rode to Gettysburg ahead of the infantry to assess the
threat of the approaching Confederates. His decision to meet their columns
and choose the field of battle at Gettysburg resulted in the subsequent Union
stronghold at Cemetery Ridge.
Symonds then unraveled the rest of the story. He examined the actions of the
commanders who, arriving in Gettysburg after the fighting began, moved into
position and made critical decisions, many of them just in the "nick of time." Confederate Richard
Ewell was a relatively inexperienced commander who had served under the
stern Stonewall Jackson. Under Jackson, Ewell made no independent decisions.
However, Jackson was dead and sorely missed and Ewell was now under Lee. Unlike
Jackson, Lee gave general battle orders, expecting subordinates to respond
as events unfolded. Unused to this style of command, Ewell did not respond
as necessitated by events. Ewell then, is held accountable for NOT attacking
Cemetery Hill on the first day--a missed opportunity for the outnumbered Confederates.
Federal commander Winfield Scott Hancock arrived the first day to find
the Union army retreating through the streets of Gettysburg. Demonstrating
boundless energy and uncanny tact , Hancock reorganized the forces into a position
of strength on Cemetery Hill. James Longstreet, Lee's "Old War Horse" and
commander of the First Corps, fundamentally agreed with Lee's vision, but disagreed
with the tactics. On the third day, Longstreet faced the agony of carrying
out the misnamed "Pickett's Charge," a decision with which he personally disagreed-a
study unto itself in leadership decisions.
Unlike West Point graduate Longstreet, Union III Corps commander Daniel
Sickles was not a professional soldier and did not always follow orders.
Instead, this savvy politician and lawyer placed his men in a position which
nearly cost them the Union line on Cemetery Hill. As a side note, if Sickles
hadn't lost his leg that day and remade himself into a hero, he certainly would
have lost his command and been cashiered out of the army.
A surprise addition to the list of Ten at Gettysburg was Symonds' selection
of Edward Porter Alexander. Porter was a 28-year-old artillery commander
who coordinated the artillery barrage, the prelude to Pickett's Charge. An
interesting study in authority, Alexander might have prevented Pickett's Charge
had he followed Longstreet's lead by telling Lee the infantry wasn't ready
to proceed. The shrewd Alexander, knowing this was not his decision to make,
remained silent. Instead, the infamous charge went forward, per Lee's orders.
Drawing the action to a close, Symonds examined the victorious, but underrated, George
Gordon Meade. While the outcome of the three-day battle was a decisive
victory for the Union, why didn't Meade attack Lee's retreating army? The reasons
are complex: the troops were tired; the weather was poor; the Union commanders
did not unite behind Meade; and Lee's troops had already moved to a strong
defensive position on the Virginia riverbank.
Meade won the Battle of Gettysburg but lost an opportunity to end the war.
Lee lost the Battle of Gettysburg but successfully escaped, enabling the Army
of Northern Virginia to fight on for two more years. In spite of the many brilliant
and the many disastrous decisions by strong leaders on both sides, Gettysburg
should have marked the end of the war. Instead, it marked a bloody turning
point.
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